Address Space Layout Randomization

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Context

- Many possible ways to exploit a system
 - Side-channel attacks
 - Buffer Overflows
 - Other Memory Vulnerabilities

- Need: Preventative measures for such attacks
 - Or, at the very least, stuff to mitigate the attack in the event that an exploit does occur



Why DEP Doesn't Cut It

- Data execution prevention: a software + hardware enforced mechanism that prevents the execution of code in a non-executable memory location
 - Prevents code from being executed on the stack, heap, etc.
 - First introduced in Windows XP Service Pack 2; also in Mac OS and Linux

• In short: ROP beats DEP



ASLR

- Randomizes the location of executables in memory, such as:
 - The main program itself
 - The call stack
 - The heap
 - $\circ \quad \text{Any dynamic libraries being used} \\$
 - Memory-mapped files
 - Data structures used in the application
 - Etc.
- Idea: an attack needs to be specifically tailored to the process space at the time in which this data is randomized for the attack to have any effect.



Implementation(s)

- When should things be randomized?
 - Linux ASLR vs. OS X ASLR
- What should be randomized?
 - In other words, how aggressive should the randomization be?
- How much of the virtual address space should be used for this?
 - Very few implementations make use of the full virtual memory space for randomization



Limitations

Performance:

- Really only feasible on more powerful devices
- Compatibility Issues
- How do you randomize growable objects?

Security:

- Doesn't trap the attack
- No information provided
- Not actually that robust

Sources

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